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Comments
The Law of Standing and its Relation
to the Environment:
As Compared to Standing to Assert
the Constitutional Rights of Third Parties
and Standing under the Fourth Amendment
In 1965, the Forest Service of the Department of Agriculture pub-
lished a prospectus inviting interested parties to submit bids for the
construction of a year-around recreational resort in Mineral King Val-
ley in the Sequoia National Forest. Walt Disney Productions, according
to the Secretary of Agriculture, submitted the best proposal. Disney
Productions' plan for the project was approved by the Forest Service in
1969. A new access highway and electrical transmission lines were also
given approval to be built.
The final plan would result in a $35 million complex of motels, res-
taurants, swimming pools, parking lots, and other structures designed
to accommodate some 14,000 visitors a day. In the past, Mineral King
Valley had been relatively inaccessible and the number of visitors was
limited; this new complex would alter the quasi-wilderness nature of
the Valley.
The commercialization of Mineral King Valley will certainly have
ramifications on the environment of that area. If the Valley is haphaz-
ardly developed, a loss of the quasi-wilderness nature will result. This
loss will have been occasioned by action taken by the Department of
Agriculture.
If an injury will result from governmental action, it is open to ques-
tion how to prevent that loss. In the Mineral King Valley situation, an
injunction to restrain the granting of permits for construction is one
remedy available. The problem is who can seek the injunction. Before
a court reviews governmental agency decisions, it must insure the
person seeking relief is the proper party to do so. Phrased in different
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terms, the plaintiff must be able to show he has "standing" to sue for
the relief requested.
STANDING
The elementary reasoning to permit one to judicially challenge gov-
ernmental action is basically two-fold. A principle of justice must pre-
vail, so that one who is hurt by illegal action will have a remedy.' Sec-
ondly, the granting of standing provides a healthy check on govern-
mental action.
Judicial challenge in federal courts is defined and limited by article
III of the Constitution.2 In terms relevant to the question of standing
in environmental suits, judicial power of the federal courts is constitu-
tionally limited to "cases or controversies." To fulfill the constitutional
requirement, the courts presently hold that the plaintiff must have a
"personal stake in the outcome.' 3 Thus federal courts will not give an
advisory opinion, 4 nor decide political questions.5 Neither will they
decide a question that has been mooted by subsequent development.6
One must have standing to be within the jurisdiction of the federal
courts.
EVOLUTION OF THE DOCTRINE OF STANDING: THE EARLY CASES
To understand the concept of standing, a knowledge of the historical
progression of important cases is necessary. In the landmark case of
Massachusetts v. Mellon,7 a taxpayer sued the Secretary of the Treasury
on the theory that federal expenditures under the Maternity Act were
illegal because Congress exceeded its constitutional authority. The in-
dividual taxpayer was denied standing on the ground that she had not
"sustained or is immediately in danger of sustaining some direct in-
1. See, e.g., Administrative Procedure Act § 701, 5 U.S.C. § 701 (1970). The action of
"each Authority of the Government of the United States" is subject to judicial review
except where there is a statutory prohibition on review or where "agency action is com-
mitted to agency discretion by law."
2. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 provides: "The judicial Power shall extend to all cases, in
Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States . . .
[and] to controversies .... "
3. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 98 (1968).
4. See, e.g., Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346 (1911).
5. Commercial Trust Co. v. Miller, 262 U.S. 51 (1923).
6. See, e.g., California v. San Pablo & Tulare R.R., 149 U.S. 308 (1893).
7. 262 U.S. 447 (1923) (also commonly cited as Frothingham v. Mellon).
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jury .... ." The Supreme Court stated that the taxpayer's interest in
the federal treasury was too minute to allow standingY
In Tennessee Electric Power Co. v. TVA, 10 the Supreme Court re-
fined its position in Mellon by clarifying what the plaintiff must prove
in order to have standing." One threatened with direct injury by gov-
ernmental action may not challenge that action "unless the right in-
vaded is a legal right--one of property, one arising out of contract, one
protected against tortious invasion, or one founded on a statute which
confers a privilege."' 2
A partial clarification of standing criteria came in the Supreme
Court's decision in FCC v. Sanders Brothers Radio Station.13 The issue
was whether the existing broadcasting station, which would be econom-
ically injured by competition, had standing to challenge the FCC's
grant of a permit to a new station. Standing was granted under a statu-
tory provision allowing judicial review by "any party aggrieved" by
the actions of the FCC.' 4 The Court recognized that Sanders Brothers
had no traditional contract or tort right at stake but did fall within the
statutory privilege provision espoused in Tennessee Power. Relying
on the Tennessee Power rationale, the Court noted that Congress was
of the opinion that a competitor would be the only one with a sufficient
interest to bring to the courts any possible errors committed by admin-
istrative agencies.' 5 Also, it was within legislative power to confer stand-
8. Id. at 448.
9. Id. at 487. But, the Court at the same time distinguished municipal taxpayer suits
and granted standing. Bradfield v. Roberts, 175 U.S. 291 (1889). This has been criticized by
Professor Davis. He feels that today certain large corporations who pay enormous taxes
cannot be said to have only a "minute" interest at stake in the federal treasury. 3 K. DAVIS,
ADMINis'raAnvE LAW TEAnSE § 22.09 (1958) [hereinafter cited as DAVIS]. Also this economic
test fails to measure the plaintiff's interest in assuring a true adversary will represent his
viewpoint. See Hennigan, The Essence of Standing: The Basis of a Constitutional Right
to be Heard, 10 Aiuz. L. Rv. 438 (1968).
10. 306 U.S. 118 (1939).
11. In Tennessee Power numerous competing electric companies sought to enjoin the
Tennessee Valley Authority from distributing and selling electric power alleging uncon-
stitutionality of this procedure. Id. at 135.
12. Id. at 137-38. For another example of the legal right theory, see Perkins v. Lukens
Steel Co., 310 U.S. 113 (1940). If this legal test were the law, then no one could object to
a statute outlawing a church or authorizing unlawful searches and seizures because these
two examples are constitutional rights not expressed by the Court. These two examples
could be property rights but the Supreme Court probably meant to say that the plaintiffs
were asserting a legal right arising out of the Constitution. See 3 DAVIS, supra note 9,
§ 22.04.
13. 309 U.S. 470 (1940).
14. 47 U.S.C. § 402(b) (1970) provides for a right of appeal "by any ... person who is
aggrieved or whose interests are adversely affected ....
15. 309 U.S. at 477.
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ing to prosecute an appeal.16 This was clearly within the holding of
Tennessee Power.
The Sanders Brothers doctrine was further developed in Scripps-
Howard Radio, Inc. v. FCC.1 The FCC had granted a license to a radio
station to change its broadcasting frequency and to increase its power.
Scripps-Howard Radio Station broadcasting in the same state, operated
on the same frequency. Scripps-Howard requested the FCC to vacate its
order; but this was denied. Judicial review of that order was initiated
under section 402(b) of the Communications Act of 1934.18 Relying on
the Sanders Brothers rationale as precedent, the Court held that private
litigants have standing as representatives of the public interest.' 9 But this
is questionable for use as precedent because there is a basic difference
between economic injury and the claim of injury as representatives of
the public. Economic injury is direct and immediate harm while harm
to the representative is minute and indirect.20
At this same time, several circuit courts developed the Scripps-
Howard rationale.21 The courts molded a private attorney general con-
cept in which the private attorney general is allowed to vindicate the
public interest. 22 In Associated Industries, Inc. v. Ickes2' an association
of coal consumers challenged administrative orders directing an in-
crease in the minimum price of coal. The court required the plaintiff-
citizen show an invaded interest, one recognized at common law or by
statute, to insure the proper criteria for standing. The court stated
16. Id.
17. 316 U.S. 4 (1942).
18. 47 U.S.C. § 402(b)(2) (1970).
19. 316 U.S. at 4.
20. More than likely, harm to the representative will be minute but there is a possi-
bility it can be great. Nevertheless, Scripps-Howard juxtaposes Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262
U.S. 447 (1923), where the taxpayer was denied standing because her interests in the
federal treasury were considered minute. This case shows that if Congress may grant stand-
ing in Scripps-Howard, it may provide similar statutory standing for the private attorney
general concept in environmental lawsuits. Possibly § 304 of the Clean Air Act, 42
U.S.C. § 1857(h)(2) (1971), may implicitly grant a private attorney general suit when deal-
ing with air pollution.
21. Office of Communication of United Church of Christ v. FCC, 359 F.2d 994 (D.C. Cir.
1966); Associated Indus., Inc. v. Ickes, 134 F.2d 694 (2d Cir.), vacated as moot, 320 U.S.
707 (1943). See also Reade v. Ewing, 205 F.2d 630 (2d Cir. 1953) (upheld the standing of a
consumer to challenge an order permitting the use of a synthetic source of vitamin A
without disclosure on the label on the theory the consumer was to vindicate the rights
of public); American President Lines Ltd. v. Federal Maritime Bd., 112 F. Supp. 346
(D.D.C. 1953) (upheld the standing of competitors to challenge an award of subsidies).
22. The private attorney general concept raises several interesting problems that have
not been answered by the courts, such as the issue of whether the private attorney general
can fully represent the rights of the public as a whole. Also, whether a decision that the
private attorney general litigated would collaterally estop an individual who later felt
that his interests were different and not fully represented.
23. 134 F.2d 694 (2d Cir.), vacated as moot, 320 U.S. 707 (1943).
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that Congress can constitutionally confer on a private individual au-
thority to bring suit to prevent a statutory violation.24 The signifi-
cance is that the sole purpose was to vindicate public interest. Where
consumers are harmed and there is no official attacking the administra-
tive decision, the private attorney general would have standing on be-
half of the customers to seek judicial review of that decision.
One who purchases a campsite for a fee is a consumer just as one who
purchases a ton of coal. Although the word consumer has a traditional
economic connotation, it is asserted that users of national parks and
forests are within the definition of consumer. If Congress can provide
a private attorney general to protect the interest of coal users, it surely
can protect the purchasers of campsites. The representative of coal users
had a minute interest; yet the court allowed standing solely because he
vindicated the public's interest. The representative of park users also
has a minute interest; but he too can vindicate the public's interest.
There is no logical difference between the two. The campsite and park
users' representative should be given standing by a statutory grant.
One other circuit court decision, Office of Communication of United
Church of Christ v. FCC,2 5 applies to the environmental standing prob-
lem. In Church of Christ, an application was made for the renewal of
a broadcast license. The court held that responsible representatives of
the listening public had standing to contest a license renewal. The court
conceded that not only do competitors have an interest at stake,26 but
the general public is "most directly concerned with and intimately af-
fected by the performance of a licensee." 27 This is a practical test. It
insures that only those with a genuine and legitimate interest partici-
pate in the litigation process. Several well-known groups have adequately
demonstrated their concern for the environment. They are a legitimate
interest group. This interest would provide a foundation for judicial
review.
CHANGE IN THE DOCTRINE
The Supreme Court announced in Flast v. Cohen28 that the funda-
mental aspect of standing focuses on the party seeking relief and not on
24. Id. at 704. Review was based on § 6(b) of the Bituminous Coal Act, Act of
Sept. 6, 1966, § 8(a), 80 Stat. 649, 651.
25. 359 F.2d 994 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
26. FCC v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470 (1940).
27. 359 F.2d at 1002.
28. 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
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the questions of law he seeks to have adjudicated. The Court stressed
that the gist of the problem of standing is whether the plaintiff has
... alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy
as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presenta-
tion of issues upon which the courts so largely depend for illumi-
nation of difficult constitutional questions. 29
Although Flast, involving first amendment rights, is distinguishable
on its facts from Mellon, Flast again placed the issue of whether a
taxpayer has standing to challenge the legality of legislative action.
In finding that standing existed, the Court determined that the differ-
ence between Flast and Mellon was the infringement of a constitutional
right of the taxpayer as compared to a mere generalized grievance about
governmental conduct.30 The importance of Flast is that the inquiry
shifted from the nature of the right asserted by the plaintiff (for ex-
ample, contract, tort, or property right) to the nature of the plaintiff's
injury as the determinative factor establishing standing.
The Supreme Court developed a broader concept of standing in
Association of Data Processing Service Organizations, Inc. v. Camp.31
The issue in Data Processing was whether sellers of data processing ser-
vices had standing to challenge a ruling of the Comptroller of Currency
allowing national banks to provide such services. The Court, in re-
versing the Tennessee Electric precedent that one is without standing
unless the right invaded is a legal right, stated that the existence or non-
existence of a legal interest goes to the merits of the case, rather than
being a criterion for the test of standing.3 2 The new test requires the
plaintiff either to show "injury in fact," either economic harm or other-
wise, or, that the interest be arguably within the zone of interest to be
protected by statute or constitutional guarantee. 33
29. Id. at 99. Similar language can be found in Sierra Club v. Morton, 92 S. Ct. 1361,
1364 (1972).
30. In Flast the taxpayer alleged that the payment of federal funds in support of
religious schools violated the first amendment. 392 U.S. at 86. In relation to the environ-
mental problem, since there is no constitutional guarantee of clear air or water, the specific
Flast holding is of no value but several commentators have made the argument that the
ninth amendment provides the avenue for the constitutional theory. See Roberts, The
Right to a Decent Environment; E=MC2: Environment Equals Man Times Courts Re-
doubling Their Efforts, 55 CORNELL L. REV. 674 (1970); Comment, Environment Law:
New Legal Concepts in the Antipollution Fight, 36 Mo. L. REV. 78, 96 (1971).
31. 397 U.S. 150 (1970).
32. Id. at 153.
33. Data Processing involved a competitor's suit with current and future loss of profits
at issue. Economic injury satisfied the "injury in fact" test. Secondly, under § 4 of the
Bank Service Corporation Act of 1962, 12 U.S.C. § 1864 (1970) ("No bank service corporation
may engage in any activity other than the performance of bank services for banks."), a
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By holding the legal interest test invalid, the plaintiff's interest is no
longer limited to the narrow concept of "legal rights," but "may reflect
'aesthetic, conservational, and recreational' as well as economic val-
ues."3 4 The result expanded the concept of standing.
STANDING IN THE LOWER COURTS BEFORE Sierra Club
Several lower federal courts have been confronted with the issue of
whether a party who seeks to be the "champion" of the public's interest
has standing to challenge agency action. There is a trend towards liber-
alization of the traditional law of standing.
Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. FPC3 5 exemplifies this
development. There the Federal Power Commission granted an electric
power company a license to build a hydroelectric plant along the Hud-
son River in an "area of unique beauty and major historical signifi-
cance."36 This decision was challenged by adjoining landowners to the
area and conservation groups. The Court agreed with the conservation-
ists that the FPC must include environmental factors in granting li-
censes. More significantly, the Court specifically held that because the
plaintiffs' (two local town associations and a conservation group) ac-
tivities exhibited a special interest in "the aesthetic, conservational, and
recreational aspects . . . ,"'7 the traditional personal economic injury
need not be shown.38
Another exemplary case is Citizens Committee for Hudson Valley v.
Volpe.39 The plaintiffs, including the Sierra Club and a local conserva-
tion group, sought to declare that a permit granted by the Army Corp
of Engineers was beyond the scope of authority granted under the
Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899.40 The Court held that the plaintiffs
had standing to challenge governmental action concerning environ-
mental resources as responsible representatives of the public interest.
competing bank is within the zone of interests to be protected by the statute. See also
Arnold Tours, Inc. v. Camp, 408 F.2d 1147 (1st Cir. 1969) (essentially holding that §
4's purpose would be to prohibit banks to engage in nonbanking activities).
34. 397 U.S. at 154.
35. 354 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 941 (1966).
36. Id. at 613.
37. Id. at 616.
38. Standing was initiated under § 313(b) of the Federal Power Act of 1935, 16
U.S.C. § 8251(b) (1970), which gives review to any party "aggrieved by an order issued by
the Commission."
39. 425 F.2d 97 (2d Cir. 1970); accord, Road Review League v. Boyd, 270 F. Supp. 650
(S.D.N.Y. 1967).
40. 33 U.S.C. § 401 (1970).
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This recognition is attributed to the private attorney general con-
cept.41 Similar conclusions have been reached by other federal courts.
42
These cases, specifically Scenic Hudson and Citizens Committee, led
many to believe that the private attorney general concept would pro-
vide the new test to determine the issue of standing.
43
Sierra Club
The idea of the private attorney general concept was tested in Sierra
Club v. Morton.44 In Sierra Club, the Supreme Court resolved the split
of opinion among the circuit courts on the issue of whether conserva-
tionist organizations have standing. The Court held that "a mere
'interest in a problem' . . . is not sufficient . . .-45 to establish judicial
review.
The question of standing, as seen in Baker v. Carr,46 centers on
whether the plaintiff has a "personal stake in the outcome" to ensure
that the litigation will be presented in an adversarial format.47 Al-
though the focus is on the plaintiff, the standing test remains the same.
One must either show the traditional "legal interest" or fall within the
broader requirements that alleged action caused an "injury in fact" or
41. See Associated Indus., Inc. v. Ickes, 134 F.2d 694 (2d Cir.), vacated as moot, 320
U.S. 707 (1943).
42. West Virginia Highlands Conservancy v. Island Creek Coal Co., 441 F.2d 232 (4th
Cir. 1971) (non-profit membership corporation, dedicated to preserve natural areas, could
maintain an action against the supervisor of a national forest because of "particularized"
interests in that geographic area); Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Hardin, 428 F.2d
1093 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (organization devoted to environmental protection, which alleged
biological injury to man because of the Secretary of Agriculture's failure to restrict the use
of DDT, had standing); Allen v. Hickel, 424 F.2d 944 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (residents of a
metropolitan area had standing to enjoin the construction of creche as violative of the
first amendment and the court also stated that citizens may sue to enjoin governmental
use of parklands that are dedicated to public use and enjoyment); Road Review League
v. Boyd, 270 F. Supp. 650 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) (non-profit association of concerned citizens had
standing to challenge the Federal Highway Administrator). Only the Ninth Circuit balked.
Sierra Club v. Hickel, 433 F.2d 24 (9th Cir. 1970), aff'd sub nom. Sierra Club v. Morton,
92 S. Ct. 1361 (1972).
43. Commentators predicted such an outcome. See Comment, Environment Law: New
Legal Concepts in the Antipollution Fight, 36 Mo. L. REV. 78, 91 (1971); 46 N.Y.U.L. REV.
177, 181 (1971).
44. Sierra Club v. Hickel, 433 F.2d 24 (9th Cir. 1970), aff'd sub noma. Sierra Club v.
Morton, 92 S. Ct. 1361 (1972).
45. Id. at 1368.
46. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
47. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 101 (1968). This adversarial format will prevent advisory
opinions and collusive suits. Berger, Standing to Sue in Public Actions: Is it a Constitutional
Requirement? 78 YALE L.J. 816, 827 (1969); Jaffe, The Citizen as Litigant in Public Actions:
The Non-Hohfeldian or Ideogical Plaintiff, 116 U. PA. L. REV. 1033 (1968).
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the alleged injury was to an interest "arguably within the zone of in-
terest to be protected or regulated. '48
The Sierra Club claimed that a change in Mineral King Valley from
a wilderness area of the Sequoia National Forest to a ski and resort
complex would result in aesthetic and ecological changes sufficient to call
the Club a "person... adversely ... aggrieved" to seek judicial review.49
The Supreme Court recognized that aesthetic and environmental
well-being, as well as economic interest, are worthy of judicial protec-
tion. But there is the absolute necessity that the party seeking relief be
injured himself along with the cognizable "injury in fact." The change
in Mineral King Valley will not fall indiscriminately upon every citi-
zen, but only those who use the National Park will directly feel the
impact of the proposed changes. The Court noted the Sierra Club's
failure to allege that it or its members would be directly affected. Al-
though the Club stated that one of its principle purposes was to protect
and preserve natural resources, it declined to rely on asserting individ-
ualized harm. An amici curiae brief" filed by the Wilderness Society
and others pointed out that there was personal contact with the Mineral
King Valley through camping trips and tours by club members. Rely-
ing on the lower federal court decisions,5' especially Citizens Commit-
tee, it is submitted the Sierra Club thought that its "expertise" in en-
vironmental matters qualified it to act as the representative of the
public.
But no matter how qualified the organization is to meet the prob-
lem or how longstanding their interest is, to meet the Supreme Court's
48. Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159 (1970); Data Processing Serv. Organizations, Inc.
v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970). The Supreme Court in Sierra Club stated that the latter test
of standing, the alleged injury must arguably be within the zone of interests to be
protected by statute, was not relevant in deciding the case. 92 S. Ct. at 1365 n.5. Although
the Court did not explain this, there was no similar statute as in Associated Indus.,
Inc. v. Ickes, 134 F.2d 694 (2d Cir.), vacated as moot, 320 U.S. 707 (1943), or FCC v. Sanders
Bros. Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470 (1940) (granted the complaining party standing).
49. Judicial review was sought under § 10 of the Administrative Procedure Act,
5 U.S.C. § 702 (1970), which provides review at the instance of "a person ... adversely
affected or aggrieved ...within the meaning of a relevant statute .
50. 92 S. Ct. at 1366 n.8.
51. See Citizens Comm. for Hudson Valley v. Volpe, 425 F.2d 97, 105 (2d Cir. 1970);
Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. FPC, 354 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied,
384 U.S. 941 (1966); Road Review League v. Boyd, 270 F. Supp. 650 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
See also Sierra Club v. Hickel, 433 F.2d 24, 38 (9th Cir. 1970) (Hamely, J., concurring). Judge
Hamely stated that the Sierra Club did have standing. He reasoned that under Data Pro-
cessing any organization with an established interest in aesthetic, conservational, or
recreational values of a nature to be protected by statute had standing to seek judicial
review of agency action. See generally 46 N.Y.U.L. Ray. 177, 181 (1971).
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test one must himself be directly affected. This would prevent the un-
necessary and unconstitutional litigation where an organization had
only a small or relatively short-lived interest in the matter at hand.52
CONCLUSIONS FROM THE CASES
In United States ex rel. Chapman v. FPC,53 the Supreme Court ad-
mitted that stanxding was a "complicated specialty of federal jurisdic-
tion. 54 Complexities of law are barriers to justice. If one's legitimate
interest is in fact injured by illegal action, a basic premise of justice,
that a party should have a chance to prove his harm, must prevail. The
Supreme Court in Sierra Club focused directly on the problem of
whether the legitimate interest of the environmental group was in fact
injured. In holding that without a direct personal harm one lacks
standing under the Administrative Procedure Act, the Court limited
the area of harm to personal rights.5 5 Such a limitation follows Barlow,
Baker v. Carr, Flast, and Data Processing, that a personal element was
necessary to obtain judicial review.
The problem of what were the limits of Data Processing's two-
pronged test, (1) "injury-in-fact," and (2) arguably within the zone of
interests to be protected, were not clarified.
The Supreme Court in Sierra Club failed to consider the secondary
purpose of standing, a healthy check on governmental action. The court
in Scanwell v. Shay"er56 considered this purpose. Scanwell involved the
bidding for instrument landing systems at airports. The court held that
the second lowest bidder had standing to challenge the Federal Avia-
tion Administrative's choice. The court stated:
. .. if there is arbitrary or capricious action on the part of any
contracting official, who is going to complain about it, if not the
party denied a contract as a result of the alleged illegal activity?
It seems to us that it will be a very healthy check on governmental
action to allow such suits .... 57
The court suggested that the policy of standing not only includes the
ingredient of personal harm, but also provides a tool to check arbitrary
52. 92 S. Ct. at 1368.
53. 345 U.S. 153 (1953).
54. Id. at 156.
55. 92 S. Ct. at 1368.
56. 424 F.2d 859 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
57. Id. at 866-67.
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governmental action. This healthy check on governmental affairs has
significance when applied to the environmental field.
In the case of a government contract, the second or even third
lowest bidder will have standing if there is any capricious action in the
selection of the lowest bid. Even more importantly, the probability of
suit by a losing party is not sufficient to insure this healthy check on
governmental affairs. For example, if the governmental action involved
a remote and non-populated region of northern Idaho, or the Mineral
King Valley area of the Sequoia National Forest, the chances that some-
one would bring suit to challenge the governmental action are signifi-
cantly reduced. This secondary purpose of standing would bolster the
private attorney general concept to provide the needed impetus to
check government action in these circumstances. 58 The constitutional
requirement of "case or controversy" then must be a court determina-
tion that the necessary adverseness is present.
OTHER COMPARABLE AREAS OF THE LAw
In our attempt to understand the concept of standing, a review of
other comparable areas of law will be most helpful. The two areas that
will be studied are: (1) standing to assert the constitutional rights of
third parties not before the court-jus tertii,59 and (2) standing under
the fourth amendment's prohibition against unlawful search and
seizures.
1. Jus Tertii
Standing to assert the constitutional rights of others was the under-
lying issue in the landmark case of Barrows v. Jackson.60 Previously,
the Court in Shelley v. Kraemer61 held that racial restrictive covenants
could not be enforced in equity against Negro purchasers. Such enforce-
ment would deny equal protection of the laws under the fourteenth
amendment. The Court was faced with the question of whether the
defendant may rely on the invasion of the rights of others as a valid
defense to an action at law for breaking the covenant. In Barrows, a
58. Id. at 864-65. See Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. FPC, 354 F.2d 608, 617
(2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 941 (1966).
59. See Sedler, Standing to Assert Constitutional Jus Tertii in the Supreme Court, 71
YALE L.J. 599 (1962) [hereinafter cited as Sedler].
60. 346 U.S. 249 (1953).
61. 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
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party attempted to enforce a restrictive covenant for damages against
a co-covenantor who allegedly breached the covenant. But no non-Cau-
casian was before the Court claiming to have been denied his consti-
tutional rights. The Supreme Court noted the general rule that one
may not claim standing to vindicate the constitutional rights of a third
party. Nevertheless, the Court held that the reasons underlying the
rule are outweighed here by the peculiar need to protect the funda-
mental rights of the third party.62
The other jus tertii situations involve the rights of parents, teachers
and pupils which are interfered with, state action, and the right of an
organization to assert the constitutional rights of its members.
Dealing first with the rights of school children and their parents, in
Meyer v. Nebraska63 and Bartels v. Iowa,64 the Court was confronted
with state statutes prohibiting the teaching of a foreign language to
school children. They were held to be unconstitutional as applied to
the teachers because the rights of both the pupils and the parents were
violated. These rights were the liberty of pupils to acquire knowledge
and the right of parents to control the education of their children.63
Again, in Pierce v. Society of Sisters,66 where suit was brought by
private schools, the Court invalidated a statute requiring attendance
at only public schools on the ground that it constituted an unreasonable
interference with the right of parents to direct their children's educa-
tion. The Court never questioned the standing of these private schools
to assert the rights of the parents. Although this is one step removed
from the Meyer and Bartels situation, it would seem the Court felt that
the parent-teacher-pupil relationship was so integral that each could
assert the rights of the other.67
Common to these three cases is the right to education in a free and
uncoerced atmosphere. Thus the Supreme Court has relaxed the tradi-
tional rule of standing that one must be directly injured to foster im-
portant educational values. No one can argue that the "right" to
breathe clean air and drink unpolluted water is not important not as
62. 346 U.S. at 257.
63. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
64. 262 U.S. 404 (1923).
65. 262 U.S. at 400.
66. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
67. See Adler v. Board of Educ., 342 U.S. 485 (1952). Suit was brought by parents
and teachers challenging the validity of a state statute making membership in or-
ganizations advocating the unlawful overthrow of the government grounds for a teacher's
dismissal. The standing of the parents to assert the rights of the teachers was not
questioned.
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a value or "right," but as a necessity. If the Supreme Court has relaxed
its standing rule before, another relaxation is justified to cope with
serious environmental problems.
One other area where the Supreme Court has allowed the litigant
to assert the rights of third persons was in NAACP v. Alabama.68 There,
a state order requiring the NAACP to produce records of membership
was held to be a denial of due process.69 To force an association to
divulge its members' names and addresses would be a substantial re-
straint upon the members' right to exercise their freedom of associa-
tion. Although the general rule is that parties must rely on rights that
are personal to them,70 the Supreme Court held that the Association
was the appropriate party to assert the right involved.71 The Associa-
tion and its members were "in every practical sense identical;" 72 and
thus, a sufficient nexus was established to permit the Association to act
as its members' representative before the Court.
A similar claim was presented in Griswold v. Connecticut.73 A doctor
and the director of a planned parenthood league were held to have
standing to assert the constitutional right of privacy of their patients.
Although the Court did not mention in either NAACP v. Alabama or
Griswold what criteria would be used for future allowances of third
party assertions, one common element is thought to be the key. The
common element was that the doctor and organization acted as repre-
sentatives for the injured parties not before the court. These two rep-
resentatives facilitated litigation of the constitutional claims of the
injured groups.74 But this common factor is meaningless to the problem
of standing in the environmental area because, as of now, there is no
constitutional right of third parties that can be asserted.75
68. 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
69. Id. at 466.
70. Tileston v. Ullman, 318 U.S. 44 (1943).
71. 357 U.S. at 459-60.
72. Id. at 459.
73. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
74. See Sedler, supra note 59, at 627-28. Sedler contends that there are four relevant
factors that the Supreme Court takes into consideration to determine who can assert the
constitutional rights of third parties: (1) the interest of the litigant, (2) the nature of the
right asserted, (3) the relationship between the litigant and the third party, and (4) the
practicability of assertion by the third party in an independent action. He concludes that
the last factor is probably the most important.
75. Justice Douglas and Professor Stone basically propose that legal rights be given to
forests, oceans, rivers, and other so-called "natural objects" in the environment. Sierra
Club v. Morton, 92 S. Ct. 1361, 1369. (Douglas, J., dissenting); Stone, Should Trees Have
Standing?-Toward Legal Rights For Natural Objects, 45 S. CAL. L. REv. 450 (1972). Since
corporations, states, and incompetents cannot speak nor represent themselves, the courts
should also make similar appointments and handle the legal problems of natural objects
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A constitutional argument for the right to a pollution-free environ-
ment has been based on the ninth amendment of the United States
Constitution." Such a "right" would be protected under the due pro-
cess clause of the fifth amendment and would also be made applicable
to the states under the fourteenth amendment.77
The judicial precedent necessary for this argument may be found in
the Supreme Court's decision of Griswold v. Connecticut.78 In striking
down a state statute that prohibited the dissemination of birth control
material, the Court stated that each of the 'pecific rights listed under
the Bill of Rights has "penumbras .. . that help give them life and
substance." 79 Thus, in Griswold, the Court found a right of privacy
protecting citizens from governmental intrusion based on the first
amendment (right of association), the fourth and fifth amendments
(protection of a "man's home and the privacies of life" 0), and the ninth
amendment ("the enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights,
shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the
people").
Therefore, reasoning from Griswold, a "right" to a pollution-free
environment would read something like this: if environmental prob-
lems continue, one will be deprived of life, liberty or property, without
due process of the law; people are unwilling to surrender their expec-
tation that they should live in a decent environment.
Consistent with these cases, Griswold, NAACP, and Meyer, was the
touchstone "injury in fact." Each plaintiff was subject to criminal prose-
cution. In relation to the environmental area, where environmental
groups spent many hours in preserving hiking trails, natural wildlife
preserves, and parklands, governmental action affecting the work prod-
uct of the groups is the "injury in fact."
as one does those of legal incompetents. If a railroad corporation can constitute a "person"
under the fourteenth amendment, Santa Clara County v. Southern Pac. R.R., 118 US. 394
(1886), it is conceivable that a river or mountain preserve is also a "person" entitled to
rights.
76. U.S. CONST. amend. IX states: "The enumeration in the Constitution of certain
rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people."
77. See Roberts, The Right to A Decent Environment; E-MC2: Environment Equals
Man Times Courts Redoubling Their Efforts, 55 CORNEL L. REv. 674 (1970); Comment,
Environment Law: New Legal Concepts in the Antipollution Fight, 36 Mo. L. REv. 78, 96
(1971); Comment, The Environment Lawsuit: Traditional Doctrines and Evolving Theories
to Control Pollution, 16 WAYNE L. Rv. 1085, 1133 (1970).
78. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
79. Id. at 484.
80. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886).
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2. Fourth Amendment
The second area of comparable law that will be analyzed is standing
to assert the fourth amendment's prohibition against unlawful search
and seizures. The common issue in every motion to suppress illegally
obtained evidence is whether the defendant can raise the claim of il-
legality and seek the remedy of exclusion. This question is referred to
by the courts as "standing." Even though the fourth amendment pro-
hibits unreasonable searches and seizures, it is not a blanket provision
that can be asserted by any defendant. The courts impliedly demand
that the defendant must still meet the equivalent of article III of the
United States Constitution that a "case or controversy" exists. This
requirement is fulfilled when the defendant shows a "logical nexus
between the status asserted and the claim to be adjudicated.",' Appli-
cation of this general rule in the area of the fourth amendment would
require the defendant demonstrate that his constitutional rights were
personally affected.82
To better understand the analogy between standing in an environ-
mental lawsuit and standing in the constitutional criminal procedure
area, the distinction between general and specific standing must be
made. General standing requires that the plaintiff have an adversarial
interest in the outcome of the lawsuit as required by the Constitution.
To meet this requirement one must have a "personal stake in the out-
come" as defined by the Supreme Court in Flast and Sierra Club. This
is the "injury in fact" test. In the criminal law area, the general stand-
ing requirement is met whenever the defendant's personal liberty is at
stake, which is the case in every criminal trial. Thus the issue of specific
standing becomes relevant. The question is whether the defendant is in
the necessary legal position to have standing to object to tainted evi-
dence.
The Supreme Court has frequently held that the fourth amendment's
prohibition against unlawful search and seizures is a personal right.
83
Therefore, for one to be a party aggrieved in the constitutional sense,
one's rights must be violated. While the courts have expanded the scope
of standing in the judicial review context, an expansion has also taken
81. 392 U.S. at 102.




place in the question of who has standing to object to tainted evidence
under the fourth amendment.8 4
The expansion was initiated in the Supreme Court's decision in
Jones v. United States.85 Jones relaxed the traditional standing re-
quirements. Under the old rule, a person who was charged with a crime
of possession had to admit to ownership of the contraband to have
standing. The problem here is that once he admitted to ownership he
admitted guilt. Therefore, when a person is charged with a crime of
possession standing is automatic.8 6
Secondly, the Court held that anyone legitimately on the premises
where a search occurs may challenge its legality when the fruits of the
search are going to be used against him. 7 This abolished the historical
property distinctions of licensee, lessee, and owner that the courts for-
merly made to determine whether the defendant had proven the re-
quired nexus between his relationship to the premise searched (i.e.,
owner) and the unlawful search to have standing. The Court's holding
would prevent a trespasser to have standing to object to an illegal search
and seizure because one must be legitimately on the premise.
In Alderman v. United States,88 where the owner of the searched
premises was incriminated by persons conversing on his premise, the
Court held that the defendant-owner had standing to suppress unlawful
wiretaps whether or not he was present when the search occurred. This
decision placed emphasis on the concept that fourth amendment rights
are personal and that protection of the individual's liberty is utmost.8 9
Only the victims of the wrong are able to suppress tainted evidence.
This is the essence of specific standing. This is consistent with the
general doctrine that fourth amendment rights are personal and cannot
be asserted vicariously as other constitutional rights may be.90
One must consider the rationale behind the exclusionary rule to
84. See Sierra Club v. Morton, 92 S. Ct. 1361 (1972); Association of Data Processing
Serv. Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970).
85. 362 U.S. 257 (1960).
86. Id: at 266-67.
87. Id. at 266.
88. 394 U.S. 165 (1965).
89. See, e.g., Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377 (1968).
90. Id. But see McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451 (1948). Criticism of this doctrine
is prevalant. See Comment; Standing, to Object to an Unlawful Search and Seizure, 34
U. Chi. L. Rev. 342 (1942); 38 U. Cin. L. Rev. 691 (1969). These commentators argue that
the underlying rationale for the exclusionary rule is a "police-deterrent" concept that
logically dictates that any defendant should be able to object to any unconstitutionally
seized evidence. . I I
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determine whether the doctrine that fourth amendment rights are
personal makes sense. The Supreme Court in Terry v. Ohio91 held that
the major thrust of the exclusionary rule was a mode for discouraging
police misconduct. Ostensibly, one would be led to believe the exclu-
sionary rule would protect individual rights. But a minority reading
of Terry holds that the rule is really for protection of the public and
the rights of the individual are secondary. This protection of the public
in general from lawless police conduct is not consistent with the doc-
trine that fourth amendment rights are personal (in that only the de-
fendants whose rights have been violated have standing to object).
Therefore, if the exclusionary rule is aimed at police conduct, then
every person who has been charged with a crime should be allowed to
challenge police misconduct. California, in People v. Martin,9 2 has
adopted such a theory that general standing itself is sufficient to allow
a defendant to object to any illegal search and seizure.
The approach of allowing any defendant standing to object to tainted
evidence is consistent with the second purpose of standing. This pur-
pose is to have a healthy check on government action. If the object of
the exclusionary rule is based on a police-deterrent rationale, then all
police wrongdoings should be under scrutiny and subject to check by
one who will be potentially harmed.
Although the law of standing to object to illegally seized evidence
does not help to surmount an argument for the grant of standing to
the environmentalists, it does demonstrate another basic injustice that
the general law of standing encourages. The injustice is that illegal gov-
ernmental action can be used to convict a defendant and to deny en-
vironmentalists standing to protect the environment on the ground
that they do not have the necessary "personal stake" in the controversy.
CONCLUSION
The law of standing is not the correct method to decide what parties,
if any, may challenge an action because too many injustices are allowed.
The courts should look at each case and decide whether the complain-
ing party has a legitimate claim to be aired.
To deny standing to legitimate environmentalist groups to challenge
91. 392 U.S. 1, 12 (1968).
92. 45 Cal. 2d 755, 290 P.2d 855 (1955).
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governmental action makes sense if the only consideration to which the
courts look is whether the party is directly harmed. But the courts fail
to consider the important factor that suits provide a healthy check on
government action. This check is the critical function of the private
attorney general. He should be able to sue when no one else is directly
harmed or when individuals lack the necessary funds or interest.
JOHN L. LIVINGSTON, JR.
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